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I.

INTRODUCTION

It is tremendously exciting to be a scholar of constitutional law in
South Africa.
Not only do we have an extremely progressive
Constitution' and renowned Constitutional Court jurisprudence on rights
analysis, we also have highly analytical and critical academic discourse
on different constitutional issues. Academic discourse is an aspect that I
find extremely necessary for the development of constitutional law in a
constitutional democracy.
The aim of this article is to focus on the socio-economic rights
jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court and some of the
academic discourse and commentary on the subject of the positive
* Professor of Law, North-West University (Potchefstroom campus) South Africa.
This paper was first presented on invitation at the ConstitutionalLaw Conference of the
InternationalAssociation of Law Schools 11 & 12 September 2009, Washington D.C.,
USA. I wish to thank my colleague, Debra Horsten for her valuable inputs and
deliberations on this subject.
1.

See S. AFR. CONST. 1996.

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:3

adjudication of socio-economic rights. Constitutionally entrenched
socio-economic rights have the potential to transform South African
society as envisaged in the preamble which inter alia states that the
Constitution is aimed at healing the divisions of the past, establishing a
society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental
human rights,
and improving the quality of life of all citizens in the
2
Republic.
My argument on the transformative potential of socio-economic
rights is based on the research done by Professor Sandra Liebenberg.
Drawing on the work of philosopher and political theorist, Professor
Nancy Frazer, Liebenberg examines the concepts of social justice and
transformation and argues that the conception of social justice should
inform our interpretation of rights claims. 4 She refers to former Chief
Justice Moseneke who describes social justice as "the premier
foundational value of our constitutional democracy. 5 He is of the
opinion that the creative jurisprudence of equality and substantive
interpretation of the content of socio-economic rights should restore
social justice in South African society.6 He also emphasizes that the
other constitutional values of "human dignity, equality, freedom,
accountability, responsiveness and openness" should be used side-byside or even interactively to achieve the goal of social transformation.7
Liebenberg further suggests:
The winning of affirmative social benefits through litigation can
create a favourable terrain for broader mobilisation around deeper
reforms. A substantive jurisprudence on social rights can facilitate
"nonreformist reforms" and advance transformation in South Africa.
In particular, it can serve to enhance the participatory capabilities of
those living in poverty and expose the socially constructed nature of
poverty and inequality. At its best it should constantly remind us of
our constitutional commitment to establishing a society based on

2. See id. at PMBL.
3. See generally Sandra Liebenberg, Needs, Rights and Transformation:
Adjudicating Social Rights, 17 STELLENBOSH L. REv. 5 (2006) [hereinafter Liebenberg,
Needs, Rights and Transformation].
4. See id. at 6.
5. Id. at3.
6. See id.
7. Id. at 6. Liebenberg further refers to the distinction made by Frazer between two
broad strategies to remedy injustices that cut across the redistribution-recognition divide.
The first is "affirmative strategies for redressing injustice aim to correct inequitable
outcomes of social arrangements without disturbing the underlying social structures that
generate them". The second is transformative strategies which aim "to correct unjust
outcomes precisely by restructuring the underlying generative framework." Id. at 9.
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social justice, and facilitate the inclusion of marginalised
voices in
8
the debate on what is required to achieve such a society.
To summarize, Liebenberg stresses that the conception of social
justice should inform our interpretation of rights claims. 9 She perceives
the litigation process as a platform from which the poor and marginalized
are given an opportunity to voice their hardships.1 ° She stresses that
socio-economic rights adjudication does not have to bring about
structural reform." All that is needed is affirmative strategies (or socalled nonreformist reforms) which also have the capacity of
transformation and change if consistently pursued.12
The South African Constitutional Court has dealt with socioeconomic rights on a number of occasions. Almost ten years has passed
since the eminent Constitutional Court judgment of Grootboom'3 where
the court pronounced that socio-economic rights are justiciable and the
essential question before the court is not whether but how socioeconomic rights should be adjudicated. This question remains highly
contested and poses critical challenges to the judiciary, as occurred in the
Treatment Action Campaign ("TAC") case 14 where the Court was
confronted with the question of whether the policy of government on the
provision of anti-retroviral drugs to pregnant women was reasonable or
not. The state argued that the Court does not have the institutional
capacity or mandate to interfere in policy matters. 15 The Constitutional
Court replied by stating:
The Constitution requires the state to "respect, protect, promote, and
fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights." Where state policy is
challenged as inconsistent with the Constitution, courts have to
consider whether in formulating and implementing such policy the
state has given effect to its constitutional obligations. If it should
hold in any given case that the state has failed to do so, it is obliged
by the Constitution to say so. In so far as that constitutes an
intrusion into the domain of the executive, that is an intrusion
mandated by the Constitution itself' 6

8. Liebenberg, supra note 3, at 36.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 10.
13. The Gov't of the Rep. of S. Africa and Others v. Grootboom and Others 2000
(11) BCLR 1169 (CC).
14. Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others 2002
(5) SA 72 (CC) [hereinafter TAC].

15.

See id.

16.

Id. at

198 & 99 (emphasis added).
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This discussion commences with a short exposition on how socioeconomic rights are perceived and adjudicated in South Africa by
referring to case law that concerns the failure of the state to comply with
positive duties in terms of socio-economic rights and the consequent
adjudication thereof. Along with this discussion, I will focus on the
criticism by leading academics directed towards the content of these
judgments. Special focus will be placed on the reluctance of the
Constitutional Court to provide normative clarity on specific socioeconomic rights 7 and the abstract and formal approach adopted by this
Court by examining the reasonableness of the measures. I will finally
attempt to illustrate that the application and/or implementation of
alternative suggestions made by academics on the manner in which
socio-economic rights should be adjudicated may possibly place an even
more rigorous task on the courts but that this should not prevent the court
from considering these recommendations.
To illustrate the complex nature of socio-economic rights
adjudication and the possible implications of applying academic thinking
and suggestions, reference will be made to the Mazibuko cases.' 8 The
Mazibuko cases concerned the right of access to sufficient water in terms
of section 27 of the Constitution.' 9 The case was brought before the
High Court2 ° by a number of extremely poor residents of Phiri, a
township in Soweto, against the City of Johannesburg, Johannesburg
Water and the Minister of Water and Forestry Affairs. After the High
Court made an order in favor of the applicants, ruling that every resident
is entitled to 50 liters of water per person per day, the respondents
appealed the entire decision. The Supreme Court of Appeal then reduced
the quantity of water to which the residents were entitled, to 42 liters per
17. This stands in direct contrast with the view of former Chief Justice Moseneke
who argues (as indicated above) that the substantive interpretation of the content of
socio-economic rights should restore social justice and bring about transformation in
South African society.
18. See Mazibuko & Others v. The City of Johannesburg & Others (Centre on
Housing Rights and Evictions as amicus curiae) 2008 JOL 21829 (W) (S.Afr.)
[hereinafter Mazibuko W]; City of Johannesburg v. Mazibuko (Centre on Housing Rights
and Evictions as amicus curiae) 2009 JOL 2337 (SCA) (S. Aft.) [hereinafter Mazibuko
SCA]; Mazibuko & Others v. The City of Johannesburg & Others (Centre on Housing
Rights and Evictions as amicus curiae) Case CCT 39/09 2009 ZACC 28 (S. Aft.)
[hereinafter Mazibuko CC].
19. See S. AFR. CONST. § 27(1)(b). Section 27(l)(b) of the Constitution states that
"everyone has the right to have access to sufficient food and water." Section 7(2) places
an obligation on the state to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of
Rights including section 27(l)(b). Section 27(2) however limits the right to access to
adequate water by providing that the state only has to take reasonable legislative and
other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of
this right.
20. See Mazibuko W 2008 JOL 21829 (W).
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person per day provided that residents register at the City's Register of
Indigents. 2 ' Unhappy with the order made by the SCA and especially
with the reduction of the quantity of water, the residents of Phiri turned
to the Constitutional Court as highest court inconstitutional matters.22
This case was heard before the Constitutional Court on the 2 nd of
September 2009 and judgment was delivered surprisingly early on 8 th of
October 2009.23
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT JURISPRUDENCE AND ACADEMIC
DISCOURSE ON THE POSITIVE ADJUDICATION OF SocIo-ECONOMIC
RIGHTS

The Constitutional Court has positively adjudicated socio-economic
rights in the cases of Grootboom, TAC and Khosa.24 The Grootboom
case raised the issue of the extent of the state's obligations under section
26 of the Constitution, which entrenches everyone's right of access to
adequate housing. 2 The Constitutional Court emphasized that section
26(1) did not give any of the respondents the right to claim shelter
immediately. 26 The Court reasoned that the housing programme of the
Cape Metropolitan Council fell short of the obligations imposed upon the
state because it failed to provide for any form of temporary relief to those
in desperate need, with no roof over their heads, or living in crisis
conditions.27
The TAC case dealt with the provision of anti-retroviral drugs to
pregnant mothers who could not afford the drugs themselves. 28 The case
was based on section 27(1)(a), which states that everyone has the right of
access to health care, including reproductive health care. 29 The Court
stressed that sections 27(1) and 27(2) should "be read together as
defining the scope of the positive rights that everyone has and the
corresponding obligations on the state to 'respect, protect, promote and

21. Mazibuko SCA.
22. See Mazibuko CC. This discussion was initially written and delivered before the
Constitutional Court delivered its judgment. I however, felt it necessary to incorporate
parts of the Constitutional Court judgments in this discussion to stress the unwillingness
of the Constitutional Court to engage in the normative content of socio-economic rights.
23. See id.
24. See Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (S. Afr.); TAC 2002 (5) SA 72 (CC)
(S. Afr.); Khosa & Others v. Minister of Social Development & Others 2004 (6) BCLR
569 (CC) (S. Afr.); Mahlaule and & Another v. Minister of Social Development & Others
2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) (S. Aft.).
25. See Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (S. Afr.).
26. See id. at 34.
27. See id. at 52-53, 69.
28. See TAC 2002 (5) SA 72 (CC) at 39 (S. Afr.).
29. See id.
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fulfill' such rights., 30 The Court found that the State policy was
inflexible and unreasonable within the meaning of section 27(2) of the
Constitution and was therefore in "breach of the State's obligations under
section 27(2) read with section 27(l)(a).'
The Court stated that, in
order for the State's policy to be in line with the Constitution, it must be
reformulated to meet the "constitutional requirement of providing
reasonable measures within available resources for the
progressive
32
realization of the rights" of women and newborn children.
The Khosa case concerned the exclusion of permanent residents
from the social assistance system in South Africa.33 The applicants
challenged certain sections of the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992
because it only reserved grants (especially the old age grant, child
support grant and care-dependency grants) for South African citizens
34
thereby excluding permanent residents from accessing such grants.
The Court used the purposive approach to ascertain the meaning of
"everyone" in section 27(1). 35 Referring to section 7(1) of the
Constitution, the Court came to the conclusion that the term includes "all
people in our country" and reasoned that it might be reasonable to
exclude citizens from other countries who are visitors and illegal
residents, because they have only a tenuous link with South Africa.36
Permanent residents, on the other hand, have resided in the country for
some time, they have made South Africa their home and, in most cases,
their children are born here.37
In all these cases the Constitutional Court refused to recognize an
immediate, direct and individual entitlement to a specific socio-economic
right. Although the outcome of these cases has been widely welcomed,
the manner in which the outcome was reached did not escape severe
academic scrutiny. Most of the criticism 38 directed at the Constitutional
30. Id. at 39.
31. Id.at 80.
32. Id.at 122.
33. See generally Khosa 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) (S. Afr.); Mahlaule 2004 (6)
BCLR 569 (CC) (S. Afr.).
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 59.
38. lAN CURIE & JOHAN DE WAAL, THE BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK 166 (5th ed.
Juta 2005); I. M. Rautenbach, The Limitation of Rights and Reasonableness in the Right
to Just Administrative Action and the Right to Access to Adequate Housing, Health
Services and Social Security, 2005 J. S. AFR. L. 627, 628 (2005); Stu Woolman & Henk
Botha, Limitations, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 1,3-4 (Stu Woolman et al.
eds., 2nd ed. Juta 2006); Kevin Iles, Limiting Socio-Economic Rights: Beyond the
InternalLimitations Clauses, 20 S. AFR.J. HUM. RTs. 448, 453 (2004); Carol Steinberg,
Can Reasonableness Protect the Poor?- A Review of South Africa's Socio-Economic
Rights Jurisprudence, 123 S.AFRICAN L.J. 264, 267 (2006); D.M. Davis, Adjudicating
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Court relates to the reluctance of the Constitutional Court to provide
normative clarity to the content of the different socio-economic rights.39
This goes hand in hand with the criticism that the court side steps an
explanation of the content of the right by immediately turning to an
examination of the obligations on government by enquiring into the
reasonableness of the measures.
Marius Pieterse criticizes the court for not providing normative
clarity on a particular right. 40 He indicates that "courts are experts in
interpretation and are ideally suited to lend content to social rights and
the standards of compliance that they impose. 41 In a similar vein, David
Bilchitz proposes that the court should first attempt to understand the
content of the right and then engage in an inquiry into the reasonableness
of the measures.42 He further emphasizes that it is not expected that the
courts should give a final and complete definition of the particular right
but calls upon the courts to formulate the international concept of
minimum core for South African circumstances.43 Marinus Wiechers
even goes so far as to remark that the Constitution is a policy document
against which all policies of the state must be evaluated and it is
inevitable that the courts have a secondary policy making function. 4 In
line with this reasoning, the Constitutional Court itself acknowledged
that the courts are only required to set an invariable universal standard
and not specific measures that the state has to take.45

the Socio-Economic Rights in the South African Constitution: Towards 'Deference Lite'?,
22 S. AFR.J. HuM. RTs. 301, 312 (2006); David Bilchitz, Giving Socio-Economic Rights
Teeth: The Minimum Core and its Its Importance, 119 S. AFRICAN L.J. 484, 496 (2002)
[hereinafter Bilchitz, Giving Socio-Economic Rights Teeth]; Marius Pieterse, Coming to
Terms with JudicialEnforcement of Socio-Economic Rights, 20 S.AFR.J. HuM. RTs. 383,
387 (2004); David Bilchitz, Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum core:
Laying the Foundationsfor Future Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence, 19 S.AFR.J.
HUM. RTs. 1, 7 (2003) [hereinafter Bilchitz, Towards a Reasonable Approach]; Craig
Scott & Philip Alston, Adjudicating ConstitutionalPrioritiesin a TransnationalContext:
A Comment on Soobramoney Legacy and Grootboom'sPromise, 16 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTs.
206, 260 (2000); Anashri Pillay, Reviewing Reasonableness: An Appropriate Standard
for Evaluating State Action and Inaction, 122 S. AFRiCAN L.J. 419, 419 (2005).
39. The Court is furthermore criticized for the its outright refusal to recognize a
minimum core entitlement of each right and for not developing a universal standard for
each socio-economic right.
40. See generally Pieterse, supra note 38.
41. Id. at. 395.
42. See generally Bilchitz, Towards a Reasonable Approach, supra note 38.
43. See id. at 7-8; Bilchitz, Giving Socio-Economic Rights Teeth, supra note 38, at
484; DAvID BILCHITZ, POVERTY AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 158 (Oxford University Press
2007) [hereinafter Bilchitz, Poverty andFundamentalRights].
44. Marinus Wiechers, Quo Vadis Geregtelike Hersiering van Administratiewe
handelinge?, 2005 J.S. AFR. L. 474, 474-475 (2005).
45. Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd. v. Minister of Environmental Affairs & Tourism,
2004 (7) BCLR 686 (CC), 104 (S.Afr.). It was also indicated above that the former
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The arguments presented above suggest that the courts should firstly
define a socio-economic right. It is not expected that the court rewrite
policy or prescribe specific measures. The court needs only to set an
invariable universal standard. I have argued previously that in the
absence of such a universal standard the court will be unable to establish
whether or not the measures taken by the state are reasonable. The
content of the right provides the referent against which the measures
should be examined.46
So far the Constitutional Court has employed the reasonableness
inquiry in all socio-economic rights cases which concerned the positive
adjudication of these rights.47 In the first case before the Constitutional
Court, the Soobramoney case, the Court used the standard of rationality
to evaluate the state programme.4 8 In Grootboom4 9 the standard of
reasonableness expected by the Court required that the measures be
comprehensive, coordinated, flexible, inclusive, and sensitive to various
degrees of deprivation and reasonably implemented and conceived. ° In
TAC the Court further expected the measures (as described in
Grootboom) to be transparent. 51 An even stricter standard of scrutiny
was applied by the Court by making detailed findings of fact,
interrogating the wisdom of government's policy choices, and finding the
policy option proposed by the respondents to be superior in a number of
respects to government's position.52
To describe this shifting standard of reasonableness, Danie Brand
argues that the question in Soobramoney was whether the policy, at face
value, was rationally linked to the goal, while Grootboom was concerned
with the question of whether the policy was likely to achieve the goal,
and in TAC whether the policy would achieve its constitutionally
mandated goal.53 Theunis Roux, with reference to the Grootboom case,
Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court also called for the substantive engagement with
the content of socio-economic rights.
46. Linda Stewart, Interpreting and Limiting the Basic Socio-Economic Rights of
Children in Cases where they Overlap with the Socio-Economic Rights of Others, 24 S.
AFR.J. HuM. RTS. 472, 472-494 (2008).
47. Positive adjudication refers to those cases where the court was expected to
provide a remedy which obligated the state to act positively.
48. Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1997 (12) BCLR 1696
(CC), at 27 and 29 (S. Afr).
49. Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC), at
39-45 (S. Afr.).
50. See Danie Brand, The Proceduralisationof South African Socio-economic Rights
Jurisprudenceor 'What are Socio-economic Rightsfor?, ' in RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN
A TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITTrrION 33, 41 (Henk Botha, Andr6 van der Walt, & Johan
van der Walt eds., Sun Press 2003) [hereinafter Brand, What are Socio-economic Rights
For?].
51. See TAC2002 (5) SA 72 (CC), at 38 and 123 (S. Aft.).
52. See Brand, What are Socio-economic Rights For?, supra note 50, at 41.
53. Seeid.at40-41.
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argues that the Court stops short of a full-blown proportionality test by
only enquiring whether the claimant group has an equal or better claim to
inclusion than another group that has been catered to. 54 In Khosa,
however, the Court intensified the standard of review by applying a
stricter proportionality test.5 5 The Court asked whether the measures
taken by the state could be achieved through measures less restrictive to
permanent residents' rights. One reason why the Constitutional Court
employs this shifting standard of scrutiny is the fact that the context of
each particular case differs.
Factors influencing the standard of scrutiny that the Court will
employ are inter alia the position of the claimants in society; the degree
of deprivation they complain of and the extent to which the breach of the
right affects their dignity; the extent to which the breach in question
involves undetermined policy; complex policy questions; and whether
the breach also amounts to a breach of other rights.56
I agree with Brand, who argues that the Court only enquires whether.
the policies and programmes are rational, coherent, inclusive, and
comprehensive. 57 This approach of the Court in socio-economic rights
cases so far has been considered to be formal, abstract and procedural;
the measures (action or inaction) taken by the state to realize the rights
are arguably only evaluated against good governance principles.5 8
Supporters of the reasonableness enquiry have argued that a
possible reason why the court engages with the reasonableness of the
measures instead of defining a particular right is to avoid arguments on
the institutional incapacity of courts to make policy choices and the
possible infringement of the separation of powers. It has been argued
that the reasonableness inquiry allows courts to exercise more discretion,
not substitute its decision for that of the
which means that the court does
59
bodies.
legislative
or
executive
54.

Theunis Roux, Legitimating Transformation: Political Resource Allocation in

the South African Constitutional Court, in DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE JUDICIARY: THE
ACCOUNTABILITY FUNCTION OF COURTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 92, 92 & 97 (Sift Gloppen,

Roberto Gargarella and Elin Skaar eds., Frank Cass 2003). Liebenberg contends that the
test entails more than "relative inclusion." Sandra Liebenberg, The Interpretation of
Socio-Economic Rights, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA § 33.5(f)(iv) (Stu
Woolman et al eds. 2d ed. Juta, 2006). It also makes provision for cases where the state
has failed to adopt measures to realize socio-economic rights. See id.
55. See generally Khosa 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) (S. Aft.). See also Mahlaule
2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) at 82 (S. Afr.).
56. Brand, What are Socio-Economic Rights For?, supranote 50, at 39 & 41.
57. Id. at 49.
58. Id. at 37. Brand argues that the court has proceduralized its adjudication of
socio-economic rights. See id.; see also Liebenberg, Needs, Rights and Transformation,
supra note 3, at 22.
59. Pillay, supra note 38, at 439.
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Despite these points of criticism, the Grootboom, TAC and Khosa
cases undoubtedly reveal a cautious, context-sensitive approach to the
transformative potential of socio-economic rights jurisprudence by
considering the position of the weakest members of
society when
60
reasonable.
are
government
of
policies
whether
deciding
Taking into consideration what has been said, I will now evaluate
the approach followed by the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal
in the above-mentioned case of Mazibuko. Lindiwe Mazibuko was a
thirty-nine-year-old woman who passed away in May last year after a
lengthy cancer-related illness. She, along with approximately twenty
other people, shared a stand in a suburb called Phiri, in Soweto. The
High Court describes the residents of this township as "poor, uneducated,
unemployed and ravaged by HIV/AIDS.,, 61 Lindiwe, her two sisters,
their mother and their thirteen children lived in the main dwelling while
six boarders shared two shacks 62 in the backyard. No one in Lindiwe's
house was employed. Their income consisted mainly65of social assistance
64
grants63 and the rent from the two backyard shacks.
On January 28, 2004, the residents of Phiri received notice that a
prepaid water system would be put in place.66 The notice further
indicated that if the residents decided on such an installation of the
prepaid water system, their debts in arrears would be cancelled.67
Lindiwe did not receive this notice and lived without water on her
property for about six months. During this time she walked three
kilometers twice daily to fetch water. On October 11, 2004, she finally
surrendered to the prepayment water system. Under the terms of the
prepayment water system, once the six kiloliters of free water per
household per month (or twenty-five liters per person per day for a
maximum of six people) had been consumed, the water supply was
automatically shut off, and the consumer had to buy water credits in
order to be supplied with water again.68
The prescribed free six kiloliters for each stand had almost never
been enough for Lindiwe and her extended family. She indicated that the

60.
61.
62.
63.
grants
64.
65.

Liebenberg, Needs, Rights and Transformation,supra note 3 at 23 & 30.
Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2008 ZAGPHC 106 (HG) at 5 (S. Afr.).
A shack is a small, crude shelter used as a dwelling.
The mother's old-age grant was about $110 per month, and two child-support
were $26 per month.
The rent from each shack was about $25 per month.
Jackie Dugard, A Pro-Poor Critique of Prepayment Water Meters in South

Africa: The Phiri story, 2 CRITICAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 1 (2007), available at

http://www.phmovement.org/files/CHP%202007%20No2%2Water/20Rights 1.pdf.
66. Mazibuko v. City ofJohannesburg2008 ZAGPHC 106 (HG) at 108 (S. Afr.).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 3.
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water would last for ten to fifteen days if they worked extremely
carefully with the water. 69 In her founding affidavit Lindiwe explained
In our household of 20, we would only be able to flush the toilet less
than once every two days; each person could only have a "body
wash" every four days; 2 kettles of water, I sink full of dishes and
half a clothes wash per day would have to be used by 20 people.
After all the free basic water budgeted for that day was used, no
water would be left for anything else, such as70 drinking, cooking,
cleaning the house and watering my food garden.
If they wanted more water they had to sacrifice other basic
essentials such as food. This situation fundamentally compromised their
health and human dignity.7 '
The applicants 72 contested the constitutional validity of the
Regulations Relating to Compulsory National Standards and Measures to
Conserve Water of the third respondent (The Minister of Water Affairs
and Forestry) as well as the water policies of the first (City of
Johannesburg) and second respondents (Johannesburg Water).7 3 The
policy decisions challenged as unconstitutional and unlawful were the
disconnection of unlimited water supply at a fixed rate and the
installation of the prepayment meters, the introduction and continued use
of prepayment water meters and the amount of free water of twenty-five
liters per person per day or six kiloliters per household per month.74 This
discussion is restricted to the question of whether the City's policy on the
supply of free water per month to every account holder was
constitutional and focuses on the approach adopted by the courts in the
interpretation of the right to access to adequate water.
III. MAZIBUKO-AN EVALUATION OF THE HIGH COURT AND SUPREME
COURT OF APPEAL JUDGMENTS
A commendable feature of the High Court and Supreme Court of
Appeal cases was the courts' willingness to provide normative content to
the right to access to adequate water as contained in section 27(1)(b) of
South Africa's Constitution before moving on to the reasonableness
inquiry in terms of section 27(2). This is in line with the arguments
69. Founding Affidavit before the High Court at 101 & 114, Mazibuko v. City of
Johannesburg, No. 489-08, (CC Apr. 2009), available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.
org.za/Archimages/13516.PDF.
70. Seeid. at 115-17.
71. Dugard, supra note 65.
72. Lindiwe and five other residents of Phiri and other similarly situated areas.
73. All respondents are organs of state.
74. Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2008 ZAGPHC 106 (HC) at 9 (S. Afr.),
availableat http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/106.pdf.
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presented above that the courts should first try to define the right before
inquiring into the reasonableness of the measures.75
The interpretation clause in section 39(1) of the Bill of Rights in the
South African Constitution prescribes that when a court interprets a
specific fundamental right it should promote the values that underlie an
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom; must consider international law; and may consider foreign law.76
This calls for not only a generous 77 and purposive 78 approach to
constitutional interpretation but also includes a strong element of
comparative 79 interpretation. In S. v. Makwanyane and Another,80 the
Constitutional Court held that, in the context of comparative
interpretation, international law refers both to binding and non-binding
international law. 8 ' For example, South Africa signed the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on October 3, 1994.82
To date, the treaty has not been ratified, which implies that the Covenant
is not yet binding on South Africa. This, however, does not imply that
the courts should ignore the ICESCR. International law of whatever kind
is particularly important in interpreting socio-economic rights because
there is a dearth of comparable jurisprudence from international
instruments and observations of international committees for South
African courts to draw on. In Grootboom, the Court remarked:
The relevant international law can be a guide to interpretation but the
weight to be attached to any particular principle or rule of
international law will vary. However, where the relevant principle83of
international law binds South Africa, it may be directly applicable.
In accordance with this constitutional imperative, both courts
examined international law in an effort to define the right of access to
75. Bilchitz, Towards a ReasonableApproach, supra note 38, at 9.
76. S. AFR. CONST. § 39(1).
77. The Constitution must be liberally construed to take into account its terms and
spirit, the intention of the framers and the objectives of and reasons for the legislation.
See generally Shabalala v. Attorney General 1994 (6) BCLR 85 (T) and Nyamakazi v.
President of Bophuthatswana 1992 (4) SA 540 (B).
78. Purposive interpretation of the Constitution is necessary since it enables the
court to take into account more than legal rules.
79. The principles of international human rights and foreign law must be applied
with due regard for the South African context. See generally S. v. Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642
(CC).
80. S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1995/3.pdf.
81. ld.at 35.
82. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI) at 49, 1496th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter
ICESCR].
83. Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC), at 26 (S. Aft.).
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adequate water.84 The High Court also referred to Residents of Bon Vista
Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Council, where the High Court
indicated that considering international law may be particularly helpful
where the language in the Bill of Rights is the same as in the
international document. 85 The High Court concluded that where the
language of a provision in the Constitution correlates with international
documents, 86 considering international law may be instructive and
imperative.
Both courts emphasized General Comment No. 15, which concerns
the right to water, of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights. 87 The High Court indicated that water should be
available and accessible, and that this requires continuous and
progressive state action. 8888 The High Court and the Supreme Court of
Appeal emphasized the interdependence of fundamental rights in terms
of General Comment No. 15, which provides that
[t]he human right to water is indispensable for leading a life in human
89
dignity. It is a prerequisite for the realization of other human rights.
The Supreme Court of Appeal therefore describes adequate water as:

84.

Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2008 ZAGPHC 106 (HG) at

31-40 (S.

Aft.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/106.pdf; City of
Johannesburg v. Mazibuko 2009 (3) SA 592 (SCA) at
17 (S. Aft.), available at
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2009/20.pdf.
85. Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v. Southern Metropolitan Local Council 2006
(6) BCLR 625 (W) (A previous case relating to the discontinuance of water supply by the
same Court).
86. Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2008 ZAGPHC 106 (HC) at 34 (S. Aft.),
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/106.pdf.
87. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts., Substantive
Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and CulturalRights (General Comment No. 15), 1, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20,
2003) [hereinafter General Comment No. 15]. This Comment directly concerns the right
to water and the content of this right.
88. Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2008 ZAGPHC 106 (HC) at
36-37 (S.
Aft.), available at www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/106.pdf. The High Court
further refers to other international documents such as the Convention on the Right of the
Child ( 38) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ( 39). See also
Linda Jansen van Rensburg (Stewart), The right of access to adequate water [Discussion
of Mazibuko v The City ofJohannesburgCase No: 06/13865], 19 STELLENBOSCH L. REv.
415, 418-19 (2008); Siyambonga Heleba, Realising the Right of Access to Sufficient
Water in South Africa, 10 ECON. & Soc. RTs. REV. 7, 7-9 (2009).
89. General Comment No 15, supra note 87, at 1. See also Mazibuko v. City of
Johannesburg 2008 ZAGPHC 106 (HC) at
124 (S. Aft.), available at
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/106.pdf;
City of Johannesburg
v.
Mazibuko 2009 (3) SA 592 (SCA) at 17 (S. Aft.), availableat http://www.saflii.org/za/
cases/ZASCA/2009/20.pdf.
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[a] commitment to address a lack of access to clean water and to
transform our society into one in which there will be human dignity
and equality, lying at the heart of our Constitution, it follows that a
right of access to sufficient water cannot be anything less than a right
of access to
that quantity of water that is required for dignified human
90
existence.
In this passage the Supreme Court of Appeal explicitly
acknowledged the transformative potential of the right to access to water
as a socio-economic right, stressing that the aim of transformation is to
create a society based on human dignity and equality. The Supreme
Court of Appeal then describes the right to sufficient water by
specifically referencing the constitutional values of equality and human
dignity.
After considering these relevant international provisions, both
courts turned to the examination of expert evidence to shed further light
on the content of the right. The High Court preferred the expert evidence
presented by Dr. Peter Gleick, an international expert on water rights,
and decided that fifty liters of free water per person per day was the
91
quantum of water needed for health and to live with human dignity.
The Supreme Court of Appeal also considered the expert evidence of Dr.
Gleick but opted to follow the expert evidence presented by Ian Palmer
on behalf of the appellants. The Supreme Court of Appeal stated that the
amount of forty-two liters per person, as Palmer suggested, was still
adequate under section 27(1) of the Constitution for a dignified
92
existence.
Liebenberg and Dugard commend the Supreme Court of Appeal for
its effort to give normative content to section 27(1) of South Africa's
Constitution:
There are certain positive features of the Court's reasoning in relation
to this aspect. These include its willingness to engage with the
substantive interests and values that affect water as a human right,
and to articulate normative standards against which the sufficiency of
the water supply to an impoverished community must be measured.
The Court was also unambiguous in affirming that the right of
"access to" water was not equivalent to access through exclusively
commercial mechanisms. It included a constitutional obligation to
ensure that water is economically accessible to the poor, including an
90. City of Johannesburg v. Mazibuko 2009 (3) SA 592 (SCA) at 17 (S. Afr.)
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2009/20.pdf
91. Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2008 ZAGPHC 106 (HC) at
170-78 (S.
Aft.) http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/106.pdf
92. City of Johannesburg v. Mazibuko 2009 (3) SA 592 (SCA) at
21-24 (S. Afr.)
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2009/20.pdf
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obligation to supply free water to meet basic needs. The serious
consideration which the Court gave to leading international law
standards on water rights in interpreting section 27 of the
Constitution and its engagement with expert evidence on the water
needs of 93the Phiri community are also positive features of the
judgment.

The High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal further referred
to the significance of other fundamental rights in strengthening the
importance of the positive adjudication of the right of access to water.
The High Court especially focused on the international recognition of the
interdependence of fundamental rights by referring to the fact that no
dignified existence is possible without water and that water is crucial to
maintain health.94 This highlights the interrelatedness of the right to
health care 95 and human dignity9 6 to strengthen the importance of
recognizing the right of access to adequate water.
As pointed out above there are various positive features about the
manner in which both the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal
handled the Mazibuko case. The most positive feature in my view is the
approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the provision of normative
content to the right to access to adequate water and the envisaging of the
transformative potential of such an approach in achieving a society based
on human dignity and equality.
I am however of the opinion that both courts went too far in their
effort to provide normative clarity to this specific right by prescribing a
specific quantified amount of water per person per day to which a person
is entitled instead of using a broader universal standard based on the
values in the Constitution. The danger of this approach lies in the
possibility that it may be unattainable for government to implement the
order made by the Court which will automatically bring the credibility of
the Court in the transformation of society into disrepute.
For example, what may be sustainable (and accessible) in one part
of South Africa may be totally unsustainable in other parts. It is clear
that water is accessible and available in the City of Johannesburg. The
City of Johannesburg falls within the province of Gauteng that is the
smallest and wealthiest in South Africa. In the First and Second
93. Jackie Dugard & Sandra Liebenberg, Muddying the Waters: The Supreme Court
of Appeal's Judgment in the Mazibuko case, 10 EcON. & Soc. RTS. REV. 11, 15 (2009)
(emphasis added).
94. Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2008 ZAGPHC 106 (HC) at 124 (S. Afr.)
www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/106.pdf.
95. Section 27(l)(a) reads: "Everyone has the right to have access to health care
services, including reproductive health care." S. AFR. CONST. § 27(1)(a).
96. Section 10 reads: "Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their
dignity respected and protected." Id. § 10.
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Respondents' Heads of Argument before the Constitutional Court in the
Mazibuko case, the City of Johannesburg indicated that changes have
already been made to the City's policy on the provision of water to
indigent persons. These policy changes were already implemented on 1
July 2009 prior to the applicants launching proceedings before the
Constitutional Court.97 It entails the revision of the Expanded Social
Package in terms of which those on the highest band of the City's
Poverty Index receive 50 liters of free basic water per person per day.98
Unlike in the City of Johannesburg, there exists no similar access and
availability in other parts of the country. An example is Kamiesberg in
the Northern Cape Province of South Africa where water is extremely
scarce and there exists no infrastructure to supply water. 99 A recent
report on Water Service Delivery by the Department Water Affairs and
Forestry explicitly recognizes that the local municipality of Kamiesberg
is only able to supply indigent households with a free basic water supply
of 2 kiloliters per household per month.'0 0
The availability of water as a scarce resource and the situation
described above furthermore require that the court considers the
environmental right in section 24 of the South African Constitution.
Section 24 states:
Everyone has the right-(a) to an environment that is not harmful to
their health or well-being; and (b) to have the environment protected,
for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable
legislative and other measures that-(i) prevent pollution and
ecological degradation; (ii) promote conservation; and (iii) secure
ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources
while promoting justifiable economic and social development.

The environmental right also strengthens the importance of access
to clean water to maintain health (and well-being) but further implies that
scarce resources such as water should be dealt with carefully and that due
97. The fact that the City already amended its policy in accordance with the amount
prescribed by the High Court questions the necessity of taking the matter to the
Constitutional Court.
98. See Mazibuko CC Case CCT 39/09 2009 ZACC 28, First and Second
6.2, 12.1, and 18.1 (S. Afr.). Other revised policy
Respondents' Heads of Argument
changes include special mechanisms which allow individuals to make representations
based on special needs for further allocations. Such extended benefits are based on
special needs including, amongst others, households with a history of abuse, pensionerheaded households, single-parent households, households with chronic illness, and
households with members living with HIV/AIDS.
99. See Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, Water Services Planning
Reference Framework-Northern Cape WSAs Kamiesberg Presidentialvisit to Namakwa
(22-23 November 2008).
100. See id. at 8.

2010]

ADJUDICATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS

regard should be given to the protection thereof for future generations.
Neither the High Court nor the SCA directly addressed the issue of the
sustainability of water as a natural resource. 0 1 I suggest that the courts
should either consider sustainability when interpreting the right to access
to adequate water or when the court employs the reasonableness inquiry
in terms of section 27(2). This simply implies that the courts should
consider not only economic or financial availability but should also
consider environmental and social availability of a scarce resource such
as water.
Another example of the complexity of the adjudication of socioeconomic rights relates to the actual availability of water for the
exclusive use of domestic and sanitation purposes. The agricultural
sector in South Africa is responsible for more than 60% of the total water
usage available in South Africa. A further 15% of the total water
resources is consumed by industry and manufacturing pooled with
mining and energy. Less than 25% of the available water resources go to
Although the South African
domestic supply and sanitation. 102
Constitution prioritizes access to water for domestic purposes as a
fundamental right10 3 it is difficult to foresee that a court will interfere
with the allocation of water in different sectors.
The last example highlighting the complex questions faced by
courts occurs when adjudication of socio-economic rights relates to the
environmental concern of the preservation of water. Although the
Constitutional Court should recognize the need to preserve water (to
guarantee environmental, economical and societal sustainability) this
should not fundamentally compromise the health and well-being of any
vulnerable and poor community in South Africa and their special
needs. 104 The Constitutional Court should inform local governments that
101. Chairporn Vithessonthi, CorporateEcological SustainabilityStrategy Decisions:
The Role of Attitude Towards Sustainable Development, 6 J. ORGANISATIONAL
TRANSFORMATION & SOC. CHANGE 49, 49-64 (2009). Sustainability refers to the ability
of one or more entities either individually or collectively to exist and flourish (either
unchanged or in evolved forms) for lengthy time frames, in such a manner that the
existing and flourishing of another collectively of entities is permitted at related levels
and in related systems.
102. Tewari, D.D., Free Water and Economic Development-Can They Co-Exist?,
1(8) THE WATER WHEEL 33,35 (2009).

103. This implies that courts should give priority to the human right to water above
other water uses. See Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v. S. Metropolitan Council 2006
(6) BCLR 625 (W) (ruling in favor of the residents and restoring the water supply where
the residents of the block of flats' water was disconnected due to their non-payment).
This case indicates that the right to water use was regarded as priority over the
contractual right to water use.
104. See Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 CC; TAC 2002 (5) SA 72 CC; Khosa
2004 (6) BCLR 569 CC (S. Afr.) (revealing a cautious, context-sensitive approach to the
transformative potential of socio-economic rights jurisprudence by taking into
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when they formulate policy on water service delivery, the needs of the
poor and vulnerable should receive special attention. When local
governments only adhere to the needs of their more affluent customers
who can afford to pay and subsequently use a limited resource to any
extent, such a water service delivery programme cannot be conceived as
being reasonable.
IV. MAZIBUKO CONSTITUTIONAL COURT: Two STEPS BACK?

On the 8 th of October 2009 the Constitutional Court °5 delivered a
unanimous judgment on the Mazibuko case.
In the introductory
statement the Court recognizes the importance of the right of access to
water 1°6 and stresses the existing inequalities in the provision of water to
07
the poor.1
The Court remarks that "[t]he achievement of equality, one
of the founding values of our Constitution, will not be accomplished
while water is abundantly available to the wealthy, but not to the poor."
The Court also acknowledges the fact that South Africa is an arid country
and providing access to water to everyone requires careful management
of water services in a sustainable manner.' 0 8
Notwithstanding the recognition of the inequalities in the provision
of water and water services and the transformative vision of the
Constitution to rectify these inequalities, the Court explicitly restricts its
role in the "interpretation" process under the rather ironic heading "[t]he
role of the courts in determining the content of social and economic
rights: the proper interpretation of section 27(l)(b) and 27(2) of the
Constitution"' 9 by arguing that the nature of a right can only be
understood if the context of the obligations imposed by it. O'Regan J
observes
The Constitution envisages that legislative and other measures will be
the primary instrument for the achievement of social and economic
rights. Thus it places a positive obligation upon the state to respond
to the basic social and economic needs of the people by adopting
reasonable legislative and other measures. By adopting such
measures, the rights set out in the Constitution acquire content, and

consideration the position of the weakest members of society when deciding whether
policies of government are reasonable.).
105. Mazibuko CC Case CCT 39/09 2009 ZACC 28 (S.Afr.).
106. Id. at l.
107. Id. at 2.
108. Id. at
3 and 23.
109. Id. at 46 (It will be asserted that the court did not interpret the right to water at
all.) (emphasis added).

2010]

ADJUDICATING SocIo-ECONOMIC RIGHTS

that content is0 subject to
reasonableness."1

the

constitutional standard of

As predicted above the Constitutional Court again denies the
existence of a directly enforceable obligation on the state to provide
sufficient water on demand to every person.'
The Court argues that
similar arguments were presented to the Court in the cases of Grootboom
and TAC in respect of a minimum core or basis content which must be
provided by the state." 12 Referring to the TAC case the Court argues
Courts are ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues where Court orders
could have multiple social and economic consequences for the
community. The Constitution contemplates rather a restrained and
focused role for the Courts, namely, to require the State to take
measures to meet its constitutional obligations and to subject the
reasonableness of these measures to evaluation. Such determinations
of reasonableness may in fact have budgetary implications, but are
not in themselves directed at rearranging budgets. In this way, the
judicial, legislative and executive functions achieve appropriate
constitutional balance.113
The Court indicates that the applicants in this particular case
expressly rejected a minimum core and expected the Court to determine
a higher amount than the legislatively prescribed 25 liters per person per
day. 114 The Court also rejects the acceptance of a higher quantified
amount for the same reasons it denies the existence of a minimum
core. 115

The Court bases its decision to abstain from giving content to the
right to access to sufficient water on two grounds. The first ground
arises from the text of the Constitution and the second from the
understanding of the proper role of courts in the South African
constitutional democracy. 1 6 Along with the latter ground the Court
insists that it is not institutionally equipped to define a particular socio17
economic right."
Referring to the text of the Constitution, the Court reasons that
reference to the phrase "progressive" realization in section 27(2)
110. Mazibuko CC Case CCT 39/09 2009 ZACC 28, at 67 (S. Aft.) (emphasis
added).
111. Id. at 48-50.
112. Id. at
52-55.
113. TAC 2002 (5) SA 72 CC 38. See also Mazibuko CC Case CCT 39/09 2009
ZACC 28, at 55 (S. Aft.).
114. TAC 2002 (5) SA 72 CC, at 56.
115. Id.
116. Id.at 57.
117. Mazibuko CC Case CCT 39/09 2009 ZACC 28, at 62 (S. Aft.).
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indicates an implicit recognition that the right cannot be realized
immediately."18 The Court further reasons that fixing a quantified fixed
amount would be rigid and counter-productive and would prevent an
analysis of the context." 9 This argument is in line with the reasoning
presented above, 120 where I argued that the High Court and SCA went
too far in their efforts to provide normative clarity to this specific right
by prescribing a specific amount of water per person per day, to which a
universal standard which
person is entitled instead of using a broader
2
'
quantified.1
be
to
have
may not necessarily
Referring to the proper role of the court in a constitutional
democracy, the Court argues:
Secondly, ordinarily it is institutionally inappropriate for a court to
determine precisely what the achievement of any particular social and
economic right entails and what steps government should take to
ensure the progressive realisation of the right. This is a matter, in the
first place, for the legislature and executive, the institutions of
government best placed to investigate social conditions in the light of
available budgets and to determine what targets are achievable in
relation to social and economic rights. Indeed, it is desirable as a
matter of democratic accountability that they should do so for it is
and promises that are subjected to democratic
their programmes
22
popular choice.1

In this statement the Court loses track of the fact that although it is
the primary role of the legislature and executive to realize socioeconomic rights, the courts also have a quasi law-making23role to translate
these constitutional rights into enforceable legal claims.
The reasoning of the Court discussed above and the recognition by
the Court that legislative and other measures should inform the content
of rights is, to say the least, extremely disappointing.124 Liebenberg
correctly argues that

57-59.
118. Id. at
119. Id.at 60.
120. Id. at 90.
121. It is not expected that the Court determine a precise quantity or give a final and
complete definition of a particular right. See Bilchitz, Giving Socio-Economic Rights
Teeth, supra note 38, at 484; Bilchitz, Towards a Reasonable Approach, supra note 38, at
7-8; DAVID BILCHITZ, POVERTY AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 158.
122. Mazibuko CC Case CCT 39/09 2009 ZACC 28, at 61 (S. Afr.). In a way the
Court is saying "you voted for the ruling party, so bear the consequences if they do not
deliver on their promises."
123. Danie Brand, Introduction to Socio-Economic Rights in the South African
Constitution, in Socio-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 1, 17-18 (Danie Brand &
Christof Heyns eds., PULP 2005).
124. Mazibuko CC Case CCT 39/09 2009 ZACC 28, at 46-68 (S. Aft.).
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[t]he Constitutional Court's failure to give meaning to the right of
access to sufficient water in section 27 of the Constitution
to hold the state
significantly limits the ability of poor communities
1 25
accountable for meeting a basic human need.

By merely asking whether the measures formulated by government
are reasonable, the court defeats the aim of contextual, purposive and
generous constitutional interpretation as prescribed by section 39 of the
Constitution. 126 The first part of section 39 deals with constitutional
interpretation and prescribes the manner in which a fundamental right
should be interpreted. It is firstly expected from the court when
interpreting a fundamental right to promote the values that underlie an
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
international
freedom. It is secondly imperative that the court consider
27
law.1
foreign
consider
also
may
court
a
thirdly
and
law
The method employed by the Constitutional Court in the Mazibuko
matter reflects strong elements of legal positivism. The Court focuses
mainly on the literal meaning of the words in section 27 of the
In my view, the Court overemphasizes1 29 the text of the
Constitution.
125. Sandra Liebenberg, Water Rights Reduced to a Trickle, LEGALBRIEF, Oct. 21,
2009, http://www.legalbrief.co.za.
126. S. AFR.CONST. § 39. Section 39 states:
(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society
based on human dignity, equality and freedom;
(b) must consider international law; and
(c) may consider foreign law.
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport,
and objects of the Bill of Rights.
(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or
freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or
legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill.
127. CHRISTo BOTHA, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: AN INTRODUCTION FOR STUDENTS
114 (4th ed. Juta 2005). The second part of section 39 deals with statutory interpretation
and requires that a court when interpreting any legislation must promote the spirit,
purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights. Id. It is clear that constitutional and "ordinary"
statutory interpretation also demand a purposive approach. Id.
128. During the apartheid regime (prior to the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions)
parliament reigned supreme and no court could challenge the substantive content of
parliamentary legislation on grounds such as fairness or equality. Id. at 8. This restricted
the role of the courts to an orthodox literal approach to the interpretation of statutes. This
meant that the courts followed the meaning of the words if the meaning was clear and
equated it with the intention of the legislature. Only in cases where the meaning was
ambiguous, vague or misleading would the courts employ secondary aids to interpretation
such as the preamble, headings and long titles of the act. If this still proves to be
insufficient the court could lastly rely on tertiary aids such as common law presumptions.
Id. at 47-48. This approach is no longer acceptable where the Constitution is the supreme
law of the Country. Section 2 of the Constitution: "This Constitution is the supreme law
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Constitution and completely loses sight of the reality that no text can
have only one meaning.' 30 Furthermore, in placing too strong a reliance
on its previous judgments (in Grootboom and TAC) the Court implicitly
denies that the meaning of a text over time may evolve to have an
extended or different meaning. For example, it has been illustrated
above that the requirement of "reasonableness" for purposes of socioeconomic rights has become more stringent over time. Despite the brief
reference to the inequalities in the provision of water in South Africa and
the explicit reference to the founding values in the Constitution, the
Court does not engage with the meaning of these values and the manner
in which they should be used to inform socio-economic rights. Botha
argues
The fundamental values in the Constitution form the foundation of a
normative constitutional jurisprudence during which legislation and
actions are evaluated against (and filtered through) those
constitutional values.131
Unlike the High Court and SCA, the Constitutional Court
furthermore disregards a thorough analysis of international and foreign
law. No attention is paid to the valuable comments made by the United
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
specifically General Comment No. 15 concerning the right to water or
the very fact that foreign systems in Brazil, Argentina, France and the
United Kingdom prohibit the automatic shutdown of water. 132

of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed
by it must be fulfilled." S. AFR. CONST. § 2.
129. LOURENS MARTHINUS Du PLESsIs, RE-INTERPRETATION OF STATUTEs 223
(Butterworths 1996). I am in no way suggesting that the text should be ignored but a
grammatical interpretation is but one of various methodologies a court may employ in the
interpretation process.
130. Id. at xv.
131. BOTHA, supranote 127, at 122-23.
132. Rensburg, supra note 88, at 426 (2008). In this article I observed that an
interesting point, which is not mentioned in the founding affidavit or judgment, is the fact
that the prepayment system was outsourced to a company called Johannesburg Water
Management Company (JOWAM) (a multinational company), which signed a five year
contract with the second respondent, Johannesburg Water, for the installation of
prepayment meters in two of the poorest suburbs in Soweto, namely Phiri and Orange
Farm. The majority shareholder of JOWAM is a United Kingdom company,
Northumbrian Water. Although prepayment water meters were outlawed in the UK, this
company nevertheless applied double standards by agreeing to implement these systems
in South Africa. Damon Barrett & Vinodh Jaichand, The Right to Water and Access to
Justice: Tackling United Kingdom Water Companies' Practicesin Developing Countries,
23 S.AFR.J. HUM. RTs. 543, 552 (2007).
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THE (LAST) WORD?

I have attempted to illustrate the difficult task with which the
Constitutional Court (and other courts) are confronted when dealing with
the adjudication and especially interpretation of socio-economic rights. I
further acknowledged the work done by scholars of constitutional law on
this subject and the importance of these contributions for building a clear
and logical jurisprudence on socio-economic rights adjudication and the
transformative potential of these rights.
The interpretation of socio-economic rights demands a careful
balancing act. On the one hand, courts should be careful not to
(over)formulate government policy. 3 3 On the other hand, courts, and
especially the Constitutional Court, should engage in a process of
formulating the meaning of a specific socio-economic right. All that is
expected from the courts is to set an invariable universal standard to
bring about what Liebenberg calls "nonreformist reforms" which still
have the potential to transform South African society. As argued earlier
it is not the task of the courts to prescribe the exact measures that the
state has to take. All that is needed is for the court to formulate a
universal norm.
Describing the right as nothing less than a right of access to that
quantity of water that is required for dignified human existence is a
normative standard that still allows for context sensitive matters. It
furthermore makes provision for an approach which could allow that
poor, marginalized and specific vulnerable people in urban areas which
are dependent on waterborne sanitation may possibly need more water
than people in rural areas.
I suggest that the courts employ a comprehensive methodology' 34 in
the interpretation of socio-economic rights which includes grammatical,
contextual, teleological, historical and comparative interpretation
methods. Shared constitutional interpretation such as appointing factfinding commissions to gather the necessary information or call for
additional expert evidence may also further assist courts in the difficult
task of interpretation. 135 The courts could even go so far as to invite the
political branches of government or other organs of state to suggest
alternative normative content when defining a specific socio-economic
right. 136

133. By prescribing a fixed amount of water (for example 42 or 50 liters water per
person per day) the courts over-formulate policy.
134. See S. AFR. CONST. § 39.
135. Pieterse, supra note 38, at 395-96.
136. Woolman & Botha, supra note 38, at 8.
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